in an Open Economy
Though agriculture has long been recognized as a polluter, it has also more recently been noted as a provider of non-market benefits. Examples of these public goods that are by-products of agriculture include landscape amenities, a habitat for wildlife, and the preservation of agrarian cultural heritage (Bohman et al., OECD 1997a,b) . Though many of these benefits are difficult to define and measure, non-market valuation studies have found substantial non-market values for farmland in different regions around the world (Beasley et al.; Hackl and Pruckner; Lopez et al.) .
The notion of agriculture providing a set of non-market goods and bads as joint products with market goods has given rise to the term "multifunctionality" (Runge, 1998; Lindland; Nersten and Prestegard) . Conceptually, a multifunctional agriculture means that the agricultural production process is a multioutput technology, where some outputs are privately traded commodities and others are public goods. This case differs from standard environmental models where some activity in the economy generates a single externality.
The realization that agriculture is multifunctional has important implications for policy making at both the domestic and international levels. In the domestic sphere, policies aimed at the various externalities from agriculture are typically legislated and administered independently.
Likewise, the economics literature almost always examines externalities in isolation, either implicitly or explicitly assuming that other (potentially related) externalities are fixed or unimportant. If agriculture is multifunctional, the interrelationships among externalities implies that "compartmentalized" government programs may work at cross-purposes (Poe, 1997) . For example, many governments use price supports in combination with acreage subsidies in an effort to internalize the positive externalities from agricultural production, but it has been shown that the level of these policies must affect the amount of agricultural pollution generated and vice-versa (Ollikainen) . Jointness among externalities implies that policies to correct them must also be selected jointly, but the proper design of such a set of agro-environmental policies remains largely unexplored.
In the international arena, as evidenced by the recent controversy surrounding the agenda for the next round of WTO negotiations, the complexity of agricultural externalities will also make new trade agreements difficult to achieve (Bla ndford and Fulponi; Anderson and Hoekman; Runge 1999 ). Many countries have made known their fear that, without adequate safeguards, free trade will jeopardize the public good functions of agriculture. Trading partners who seek access to those markets, on the other hand, question whether so-called environmental safeguards may be trade distorting protectionism in disguise (ABARE, Bohman et al.) .
High-cost agricultural producing countries with high levels of support, notably the EU, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and South Korea, insist that subsidies on farm commodities are the most efficient way to secure public goods that are by-products of farm output. National food security and an authentic agricultural landscape, for example, cannot be produced separately from farm commodities (WTO, 1999a,b,c ; Norwegian Royal Ministry of Agriculture). Further, reduced subsidies and freer trade would generate additional production in low-income and lowsupport countries; high-support countries have argued that such an expansion in those countries could damage the environment (because of deforestation and the lack of environmental regulations).
Lower cost producers would stand to gain considerably from reduced support in protected countries. These governments have argued that price supports as a way of obtaining agricultural public goods are neither optimal nor desirable. Such policies distort market incentives toward the intense use of polluting inputs, and there exist less-distorting policy instruments to achieve the same goal (WTO, 1998; Bohman et al.) . Moreover, they argue, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that freer trade would improve environmental quality in both developed and developing nations, although even more could be gained if free trade were combined with environmental protection policies (e.g., Anderson, 1992a; Whalley) . Yet the most fundamental concern is that, however high-minded the purpose of public-good-providing policies may be, those policies may be manipulated to distort terms of trade.
For the case of a single externality, the relationship between environmental policy and trade has been a subject of much recent study (Anderson, 1992b; Copeland; Krutilla; Beghin et al.; Schamel and de Gorter) . This literature has revealed the potential for using an environmental policy as a tool to distort trade: A large importer, for example, may select lax environmental regulations in order to encourage domestic production, reduce the demand for imports, and lower prices to domestic consumers. However, the relationship between trade and a set of joint policies aimed at multiple externalities (i.e., the multifunctional case) has not yet been studied. This paper develops a general equilibrium framework to determine the optimal set of internalizing policies under multifunctionality and relates these policies to trade. The model is based on an aggregate multioutput technology, where two basic factors (land and non-land inputs) produce two private commodities (agricultural and industrial goods) and two public goods (the positive and negative externalities from agriculture). Because the focus is on the agricultural sector, the model abstracts from marginal changes in industrial externalities.
Production in the economy is cast in a modified Hecksher-Ohlin framework where agriculture generates two externalities.
The analysis identifies the interdependence among optimal environmental policies. In principle, a welfare maximum can be achieved through a combination of a subsidy on agricultural land and a tax on agricultural non-land inputs, but the levels of these policies must be selected jointly. In particular, if the pollution function for each acre is convex, a marginal acre of land reduces total pollution, and the optimal subsidy on an acre of farmland therefore exceeds the amenity value of that acre. Based on a set of stylized policy simulations of the aggregate U.S. agricultural sector, this interaction between policies appears to be empirically important; the estimated optimal subsidy for farmland is about 50% larger than its amenity value.
The relationship between these joint environmental policies and trade is also characterized. Small economies have no incentive to distort environmental policies away from their internalizing levels, but large economies will manipulate domestic policies in order to exploit terms of trade. Consistent with observation, large importers such as Japan can improve domestic welfare by over-subsidizing public goods, while large exporters like the U.S. prefer strict regulations to l imit pollution. Empirical simulations of U.S. agriculture suggest that environmental policies can be effective at distorting trade. If these policies were used to exploit terms of trade, the U.S. alone could increase world agricultural prices by an estimated 9% over a base case of no environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A theoretical section first describes the model economy and then derives optimal environmental policies for a closed economy, a small open economy, and a large open economy. To illustrate the theoretical relationships and explore their potential quantitative impacts, the next section simulates an empirical version of the model for the U.S. agricultural sector. The conclusions drawn from our findings and their implications for policy are examined in the final section.
The Model Economy
Let x and y represent agricultural and non-agricultural goods, respectively. These two commodities can be produced from two basic factors, land L and non-land inputs Z. In addition, the agricultural production process generates non-market amenities a and emissions of pollution e. The technology set for aggregate production in this economy is:
If there are no direct links between the agricultural and non-agricultural production processes, then a tradeoff between the output of the two commodities occurs only because inputs must be diverted away from one industry in order to increase production in the other. Assume the two technologies can be represented by the production functions:
and
where L i and Z i are the amount of land and other inputs allocated to the production of good i, respectively.
Let L and Z represent the endowment of land and non-land inputs, respectively, and assume the entire endowment of each factor is homogeneous in quality. Presuming non-wasteful allocations, production is subject to the feasibility conditions:
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and exhibits constant returns to scale. By
and f i (⋅) is the per-acre production function. 
The last expression has the same sign as g(z x )/z xg′(z x ) < 0, where the inequality follows from the Mean Value Theorem. Intuitively, an acre increase in L x produces two effects on e: the extra pollution on the acre added, and the decrease in pollution on the acres previously in production that follows from a change in the input ratio Z x /L x . If pollution satisfies CRS, the change in the input ratio decreases pollution by g′(⋅)z x ; the net effect is always negative because "average pollution" g/z x must be less than "marginal pollution" g′ if g is convex (the opposite of the analogous relationships for a concave production function). More generally, if pollution is not necessarily CRS, the effect on total pollution from an increase in farmland depends on the heterogeneity of land; bringing an environmentally sensitive acre of land into production may increase total pollution. However, provided that the pollution function on every parcel of land is convex, the extra pollution from an extra acre is likely to be outweighed by the combined decrease in pollution on the acres already in production. 3 Conceptually, there is a more general amenity function that relates the quantity of agricultural land to the amount of amenity services produced. Because of the obvious difficulties in measuring and observing amenity services per se, the valuation literature assumes that amenities are produced in proportion to the agricultural land base and attempts to estimate the value of amenities per acre (Poe, 1999) . National income I is the total payments received on the factors used in the two industries.
Consumers use income to purchase x and y, but cannot influence the levels of a and e. Taking y to be the numeraire and letting p be the price of x, indirect utility is:
The function v(⋅) can be interpreted as social welfare for a given combination of price, income, and externalities. The solutions to the maximization problem x(p, I, ⋅) and y(p, I, ⋅) are the demands for agricultural and manufactured goods, respectively.
Optimal Policies in a Closed Economy
Because a and e are public goods, the market price system cannot internalize the marginal amenity benefits of agricultural land and the marginal cost of pollution, and producers will not choose the socially optimal factor allocation unless there is some policy intervention.
Below, the optimal policies are determined using the following procedure: First, social welfare is derived as a function of the factors L x and z x , and the welfare maximization problem is solved to determine the optimal allocation of the two factors. Second, the free market allocations of L x and z x are derived under an arbitrary policy scheme, and the optimal scheme is then chosen so that the free market and welfare maximizing allocations coincide.
Social welfare in this economy v(⋅) can be written as a function of L x and z x , provided the utility function is properly restricted so that x(⋅) is monotonic in p. To verify this, note that monotonicity of demand implies a unique market clearing price p for any amount of agricultural production. Further, profits are always zero due to cons tant returns to scale, and factor payments to households (national income I) must therefore equal total revenue from the two industries.
Thus, p and I can be regarded as functions of L x and z x that are implicitly defined by the equations:
where
The problem of maximizing social welfare in a closed economy can therefore be written:
Under appropriate assumptions on u(⋅) and F i (⋅), a solution to this problem cannot occur on the boundary of the constraint set. 4 If a solution exists, it must satisfy the first-order conditions for an interior maximum:
where subscripts denote derivatives. The Envelope Theorem applied to the consumer's utility maximization problem implies that v I = u y , v a = u a , and v e = u e ; v p = -x(p, I)v I by Roy's Identity;
and the first-order conditions for utility maximization require that p = u x /u y . Substituting these conditions, the derivatives of I from (2), and the market clearing condition (1) into (4) and (5), one obtains the following equivalent conditions expressed in terms of the utility and production functions (demonstration in appendix):
Each of these conditions requires the net marginal benefits of each factor to be zero. Equation (6) defines the optimal allocation of L x . The first term is the marginal benefit of using land to produce x, the term in brackets is the marginal opportunity value of using land to produce y, u a /u y is the marginal amenity benefit of land in agriculture, and the last term (note that u e < 0) is the marginal cost of pollution. Because each term has been divided by u y , the benefits and costs are compared in terms of the numeraire. In equation (7), the optimal choice of z x is determined by setting to zero the sum of the marginal benefits of producing x, the marginal opportunity value in terms of y production foregone, and marginal environmental cost.
Although each of the preceding equations describes the optimal allocation of one factor, they are collectively a simultaneous system in both variables (L x appears in both equations through the expression for z x ). Letting ( L x o , z x o ) represent the socially optimal allocation, simultaneity implies any shift in preferences that changes either u a or u e will induce a change in
Several types of policies have been proposed to internalize the environmental effects of agriculture. Consider four policy instruments that may be imposed jointly: a subsidy on agricultural output (s x ), a subsidy on agricultural land (s L ), a tax on agricultural input (t z ), and a direct tax on pollution (t e ). 5 The policy problem is therefore to determine a policy scheme s = (s x , s L , t z , t e ) that allows the socially optimal outcome to be decentralized through free markets.
Given a set of policies s, a price p, and factor endowments (L, Z), the "invisible hand" of competition will solve the revenue maximization problem (Dixit and Norman):
Because the maximand is stric tly concave, the unique solution must satisfy the first-order conditions:
Using the fact that u x /u y = p and comparing (6) and (7) to (8) and (9), the welfare-maximizing policies s x , s L , t z , and t e must satisfy:
where the derivatives of u(⋅) are evaluated at the socially optimal levels L x o and z x o . If pollution can be observed and measured, the simplest choice of policies is to set (s x , s L , t z , t e ) = (0, u a /u y , 0,
-u e /u y ). This policy scheme is the Pigouvian outcome where each externality is rewarded by its marginal social value. Thus, if the effluent can be taxed directly, neither an output subsidy nor an input tax is necessary.
A major difficulty in regulating agricultural pollution is that damages cannot be observed and policies must instead regulate outputs and inputs directly. 6 If the effluent tax t e is eliminated, equations (10) and (11) comprise a system of two equations in the three unknowns s x , s L , and t z .
This arrangement allows a degree of freedom in selecting policies, and suggests that a social optimum can be obtained by combining commodity policy with input taxes and subsidies.
However, this result depends on the simplification of only two factors, and does not hold in general. Indeed, the possibility of using any commodity policy disappears if there exist other factors of production that are unregulated and do not affect the externalities a and e.
7
Among the four policies in s, only s L and t z are both feasible (because they act on observable transactions) and remain valid in more general cases (because they do not act on other factors of production). If the policy set is limited to these two instruments, equations (10) and (11) imply they must satisfy:
In words, the optimal tax is the marginal social cost of applying agricultural inputs at z x o . The optimal subsidy in equation (13) is made up of two components. First, farmers are rewarded for the amenity benefit per acre of farmland u a /u y . Substituting the expression for the tax into (13), the second and third terms of the subsidy are equal to
(see footnote 2). Thus, the subsidy rewards farmers by the combined social value of amenity benefits and the marginal change in pollution. This is a generalization of Holtermann's result for a single externality; a welfare maximum can be achieved through taxes/subsidies on inputs that penalize or reward each input by its marginal contribution to the externality. Here, the social 7 To see this, suppose there were a third factor, W, that is neither taxed nor subsidized and does not influence a or e. The socially optimal allocation of W must satisfy (u x /u y )(∂F x /∂W) -∂F y /∂W = 0, while the free market allocation can value of pollution u e /u y and the change in pollution with respect to L x are both negative, and the optimal subsidy therefore exceeds the amenity value of farmland.
Therefore, even if agricultural land provides no landscape amenities (i.e., u a ≡ 0), it should still be subsidized in conjunction with the input tax t z . Further, subsidizing land by the "net" value of amenities per acre will not achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Landscape
, but a subsidy of this amount falls short of the optimal subsidy in (13) by the amount t z z x o . Thus, an empirical study of the willingness-to-pay for farmland amenities will not estimate the appropriate land subsidy, even if it accounts for the cost of agricultural pollution. Determining whether this difference is likely to be empirically significant is an important goal of the empirical analysis below.
The optimal levels of s L and t z are based on the welfare maximizing allocations L x o and z x o , whic h are in turn determined in a simultaneous system (equations (6) and (7)).
Consequently, any change in the value of either externality (i.e., a shift in u a /u y or u e /u y ) would induce an adjustment in both the optimal allocation (L x o , z x o ) and policy choice (s L , t z ). For example, suppose the value of agricultural land amenities increases by $b per acre. In general, this change would lead to some (non-zero) adjustment in the optimal input tax even if u e /u y remains fixed, while the optimal land subsidy would change by some amount other than $b.
Open Economies
Suppose the economy described above is opened to international trade. For simplicity, assume that: (a) foreign and domestic production technologies are identical, (b) foreign agriculture does not generate any externalities, and (c) foreign utility does not depend on be described by (p + s x )(∂F x /∂W) -∂F y /∂W = 0. Because p = u x /u y , social optimality requires that s x = 0. domestic allocations. Under these assumptions, the allocations that maximize global welfare are the solution to the following combined Pareto problem:
where α is the relative welfare weight of foreign consumers, and asterisks denote foreign variables. The first-order necessary conditions for allocations of land and other inputs (assuming an interior solution) simplify to:
Equations (14a) and (14b) describe the optimal levels of L x and z x , respectively, while (14c) and (14d) correspond to the optimal allocations in the foreign economy. In the foreign country, each factor is employed in agriculture until the marginal benefits of agricultural production equal the opportunity value of manufactured production. The domestic allocation equations include terms for the externalities, and are equivalent to the closed economy conditions in equations (6) and
Though a global perspective is of theoretical interest, it is reasonable to assume that the home government wishes only to maximize domestic welfare. The remainder of this section determines the allocations that are optimal from this domestic viewpoint, and compares each outcome with those that maximize global welfare. The small country and large country cases are analyzed in turn.
A small open economy views the world price of agricultural goods as an exogenous variable. Now regarding p as a parameter, national income is:
The social welfare maximization problem becomes:
with first-order conditions:
Substituting the derivatives of I from the definition above and the envelope conditions v I = u y , v a = u a , and v e = u e , these conditions reduce to (see appendix):
Because p = u x /u y , these conditions imply exactly the same factor allocation that maximizes world welfare in conditions (14a) and (14b). Therefore, the optimal domestic policy for a small open economy is also optimal from a global point of view.
If the home economy is large enough so that changes in domestic production and consumption affect the world price, the price must be regarded as endogenous. The policy problem becomes:
The price and income relations p and Ĩ satisfy:
where the arguments of p and Ĩ have been suppressed to simplify notation, and x * (⋅) is the demand for exports. The first-order conditions are:
Substit uting the derivatives of v (v I = u y , v a = u a , v e = u e ) and Ĩ , the condition p = u x /u y , Roy's
Identity v p = -xv I , and market clearing, these conditions become (demonstration in appendix): These results are intuitively consistent with the use of subsidies and taxes to regulate a single externality (Krutilla) ; importers gain from policies that increase production and decrease the world price, while the reverse is true for exporters. If policy interventions must be justified on the basis of external benefits and costs, the model predicts that importers' policies will emphasize the benefits of agricultural land and undervalue the environmental costs of agricultural inputs, while exporters are likely to do the opposite.
These predictions generally coincide with observed differences in policies and negotiating tactics across nations. Importers, such as Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, all have significant policy schemes aimed at protecting farmland, and argue for the importance of the extra-market benefits from agriculture in trade negotiations. If these countries retain domestic farmland against free market pressures, and succeed in convincing their trading partners to do the same, the resulting high level of agricultural production will lower world prices and benefit consumers in importing nations. Large exporters like the United States, on the other hand, have sought to protect the environment from agricultural pollution by "harmonizing up" environmental regulations across all trading partners. If this strategy is successful, world supply will contract due to the extra cost of environmental regulations, and producers in exporting countries will receive a higher price.
A Stylized Empirical Application to U.S. Agriculture
To illustrate the relationships between policies and their quantitative significance, this section simulates the model developed above for agricultural environmental policies in the United States. In the international trade arena, the United States is a net agricultural exporter, and has a significant market share of several major commodities. Thus, it is generally believed the U.S. is a "large" country because its trade volume is significant enough to have a measurable effect on world prices. Conversely, agriculture comprises only a small part of the U.S. economy.
In 1994, the aggregate value added from agricultural production was $104 billion or 1.5% of the $6.9 trillion economy, and the cost of food items (which includes processing costs and the value of food retail services) make up only about 10% of household expenditure.
U.S. agriculture has been cited as the source of numerous forms of pollution such as soil erosion, nutrient runoff into streams and lakes, offensive odors, and contamination of water supplies. Here, the focus is on the harmful effects of agricultural chemicals on human health.
This form of pollution was selected because its link to agriculture is well documented, the problem is widespread, and to date a limited (though growing) set of regulations have been imposed to control chemical use at the farm level. On the positive side, the agricultural landscape has been found to provide a significant amenity value to residents on the suburban fringes of major cities (Halstead, Krieger, Beasley et al.) These values have led to a significant policy interest in the preservation of open space, even at the national level of government (e.g.,
Office of Management and Budget).

Simulation Model
Based on the observations made above, several simplifying assumptions can be made in modeling the U.S agricultural sector. First, the small share of agriculture in gross domestic product implies that changes in the farm sector have almost no effect on prices or production in the rest of the economy. Second, the income effect on the demand for food items is likely to be negligible because it is a necessity item that makes up a small share of consumption expenditures. Third, although pollution and landscape amenities enter the utility function and therefore influence food demand, the ir effects are not thought to be empirically important.
Given these simplifications, the agricultural sector can be described by the following model:
where η x and η x * are the elasticities of domestic and export demand, respectively; η L and η Z are the supply elasticities of the la nd and non-land inputs facing agriculture; p L and p Z are the equilibrium prices of land and non-land inputs; and the B i 's are demand and supply constants.
This system of nine equations uniquely determines the nine unknowns:
and e, which must be solved simultaneously with the land subsidy s L and input tax t z .
Equations (19) and (20) specify the domestic and export demands to be of the constant elasticity form. Equation (21) is the market clearing condition for agricultural goods. The profit-maximizing conditions for land and non-land inputs are represented in (22) and (23), which state that the marginal value product of each factor must equal its (post-policy) market price. Equations (24) and (25) are the market clearing cond itions for land and non-land inputs, respectively, where the supplies of both factors are assumed to follow constant elasticity functions. Equations (26) and (27) are restatements from the conceptual model, relating the externalities a and e to the production factors L x and Z x .
This model is based on a framework that has been widely used to simulate the aggregate effects of several different policies in agriculture (Floyd, Gardner) . Though it describes the agricultural sector in isolation, the model preserves the relevant general equilibrium effects of non-fixed factor prices through the supply functions for L x and Z x . In order to implement the model empirically, it is necessary to specify several functional relationships and parameter values. First, an aggregate utility function must be specified to calculate the welfare maximizing levels of s L and t z . In addition, functional forms for F x and g must be selected and parameterized,
and parameter values for the supply and demand equations must also be chosen. These elements of the empirical model are discussed in turn below.
Aggregate utility is assumed to follow the money metric, quasilinear form (Mas-Collel et
al.):
(28) u(x, y, a, e) = φ(x) + y + γa -δe where φ(⋅) is the utility of food, y is the dollar value of non-food consumption, γ is the marginal value of landscape amenities, and δ is the marginal health cost of chemical pollution. φ(⋅)
represents the function that produces constant elasticity demands. Thus, maximizing (28) subject to the budge t constraint px + y ≤ I results in the demand function (19), which is independent of income and the environmental measures a and e. To parameterize utility, values must be selected for the elasticity of demand η x (which appears in φ), and the environmental parameters γ and δ. Based on a substantial body of empirical evidence that supports a highly inelastic demand for food, the parameter η x is varied over the range 0.2 to 0.5. Because there is no standardized measure of agricultural pollution, δ is normalized to unity and e is measured in dollars of health costs that are attributable to agricultural chemicals.
The two primary categories of chemicals that pose health risks to humans are pesticides and nitrates that occur in drinking water from the use of nitrogen fertilizer. Because the health costs of these pollutants cannot be directly observed, we must rely on estimates from the environmental literature.
Poe (1998) Combining the direct and indirect health costs of all agricultural chemicals, the body of evidence suggests aggregate damages in the range of $3 to $7 billion, although these may be overestimates because they potentially account for non-agricultural contaminants. The base value of e is thus varied from $2 billion to $5 billion.
The functional relationship between chemical application rates and damage to human health is not yet completely understood. Because yield is a concave functio n of polluting inputs, physical properties imply the pollution function must be convex (Siebert et al.) . Thus, convexity is a natural property to impose on the health costs of pollutants as well, but there is little scientific justification for any particular functional form. Here, health costs are assumed to follow a quadratic form:
. This function has linear derivatives in Z x and z x , and therefore imposes constant marginal health costs. Thus, the specification is a linear approximation to the underlying marginal health cost function; this simplification seemed reasonable given the stylized focus of the application and the approximate nature of the data.
Data on aggregate agricultural production is available from the USDA-Economic
Research Service (Ahearn et al., Ball et al.) . This data series includes indices of aggregate output as well as inputs in several categories for the years 1948-1994. For purposes here, agricultural technology was assumed to be separable so that input categories can be further grouped into a "land aggregate" ( L x ), which is made up of land and other factors that are combined with it, and a "non-land aggregate" Z x . In particular, the land aggregate includes indexes of land itself, capital equipment, and labor; the non-land aggregate is made up of chemicals, fuel and electricity, and other purchased inputs. When technology is separable, the production decision can be divided into two stages, where inputs are combined in a least-cost way within each aggregate in the first stage, and the profit maximizing levels of the aggregates are chosen in the second stage (Chambers).
To be able to compute quantity and price series for L x and Z x , it is necessary to employ an indexing procedure that combines the inputs within each aggregate factor. Because the underlying functional form of the technology is unknown, any index must be regarded as an approximation that reflects the productive capacity of the various inputs. Here, it is assumed that the inputs within each aggregate are combined in Leontief fixed proportions. Though this procedure abstracts from substitution of the inputs within the aggregates, it greatly simplifies the analysis because the implicit price of each aggregate becomes a linear expression of the category prices. Consequently, a subsidy on land alone is equivalent to a subsidy on the entire land aggregate L x , and a tax on chemicals is equivalent to a tax on the non-land aggregate Z x .
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To solve the second stage problem, it is necessary to specify a functional form that relates L x and Z x to agricultural output. Here, a Cobb-Douglas form is assumed:
In particular, the aggregate factor index functions are:
where l represents land, K is capital, N is labor, C is chemicals, E is fuel and electricity, and M is purchased materials. The coefficients b K and b N are the quantities of capital and labor that must be combined with each acre of land, respectively, and b E and b M are the amounts of energy and materials used with each unit of chemicals. The implicit price of the land aggregate is the cost function of L x , or:
By a parallel argument, the price of the non-land aggregate is:
Thus, an addition or subtraction to p l or p C implies the same change in p L and p Z . If there are substitution possibilities within the aggregate factors, the linear price relation is a first-order approximation to a concave function. Since this concave function rises more slowly for price increases and falls more quickly for price decreases, the linear approximation will estimate a lower bound on the subsidy and an upper bound on the tax. The remaining parameters to be chosen are the elasticity of export demand and the supply elasticities for the aggregate factors L x and Z x . Export demand is probably quite elastic, but may not be perfectly elastic because the U.S. is a large country. To explore the consequences of market power in international trade, the export demand elasticity was varied between 2 and ∞.
The extreme values represent the polar cases of a very large economy with substantial market power, and a small economy with no market power. Because land makes up a significant part of the aggregate L x , we would expect its supply elasticity to be quite small. On the other hand, the inputs in Z x can be produced at very nearly constant cost, implying a relatively high supply 
Results
To explore the relationships among domestic environmental policies, the model is initially solved under three policy experiments for the small economy case. The assumption of a small economy precludes the possibility of distorting trade, and ensures that the simulated policies include only externality-correcting components. In the first policy scenario, chemicals are taxed at their marginal external cost with no land policy, while the second scenario subsidizes land at its amenity value but does not tax non-land inputs. These two experiments thus correspond to policy schemes that target each externality independently. The third experiment is based on the relationships derived in the theoretical section and includes both a land subsidy and a chemical tax that simultaneously correct both externalities.
The results of these experiments are reported in table 2. When the tax is imposed in isolation (scenario 1), farmers pay a $0.13 tax per pound of chemicals. 9 Even though estimated chemical use and health costs fall in this scenario (by about 14% and 27%, respectively), the increased cost of farming drives land out of agriculture and reduces total production. Thus, in an independent effort to improve water quality, the tax policy has damaged the public-good function of agriculture and has reduced the aggregate value of farm production. If instead a subsidy is Only if the subsidy and tax are imposed jointly can there be an improvement in both externalities (scenario 3). The tax on chemicals of $0.13 per lb., if imposed jointly with the land subsidy of $7.67 per acre, will achieve an efficient allocation of both factors. Farmland rises from its base value by 4 million acres, and external health costs fall by an estimated $900 million (25%). The optimal subsidy on an acre of farmland includes the $5 it contributes to amenity value as well as its marginal effect on pollution; an extra acre of agricultural land, ceteris paribus, reduces external health costs by $2.67. Thus, the optimal subsidy differs from the amenity value of farmland by more than 50%.
In the joint policy case, the fall in non-land inputs outweighs the effect of the increase in farmland, and domestic production decreases by $6.6 billion. Net exports contract by a matching amount, but the international price is not affected because of the small economy assumption. If the economy is large enough so that export quantities influence the world price, optimal environmental policies include components that improve domestic welfare through trade distortion. Thus, the resulting tax and subsidy may differ substantially from the external cost of chemicals and amenity benefits of farmland.
The last column in table 2 corresponds to this large economy case, where the tax and subsidy are imposed jointly and the elasticity of export demand is set at 5. Since the U.S. is an exporter, it will have an incentive to select policies that restrict production and in turn, raise the international price. Therefore, the chemical tax of $0.29 is more than twice as high as the small economy case, while the subsidy becomes negative (-$7.38) so that land is taxed as well. These policies do result in some environmental improvements because external health costs are reduced by over 30%, but these gains are partially offset by a 0.7% decrease in the stock of farmland.
The "environmental" policies provide additional welfare benefits through trade distortion.
They have succeeded in raising international prices by 9% and expanding U.S. production by 
Policy Implications
This paper has determined the optimal policy rules when agricultural production generates both landscape amenities and pollution from chemical inputs. The optimal subsidy on land and tax on non-land inputs depend on the size of both externalities, and a change in the social value of either land amenities or pollution therefore implies a change in both policies. It has been shown empirically that independent policies are likely to work at cross-purposes; a single policy directed at one externality leads to an adverse change in the other externality.
One important implication for empirical research is that an optimal subsidy on agricultural land does not equal the net value of land amenities. Numerous studies have estimated the social amenity benefits from land in agriculture using non-market valuation techniques, but these estimates cannot be interpreted as the appropriate farmland subsidy, even if the values are "corrected" to account for the value of pollution generated per acre. A simulation of U.S. agriculture suggests the interaction between policies is empirically important; if the incentive to use environmental policy as a trade-distorting tool is ignored, the estimated optimal land subsidy is about 50% larger than the amenity value of farmland. In the large economy case, the policies include components that improve domestic welfare through terms of trade, and the optimal tax and subsidy differ even more from the social values of the two external effects.
The model here abstracts from the site-specific factors that cause environmental values to be spatially heterogeneous. As a practical matter, proposed policies differ by location, and tend to focus on areas that are known to be environmentally sensitive or farming regions in close proximity to large population centers. Yet our findings are even more important for policy making in these areas, because the interaction among joint policies is more pronounced if the social values placed on the external effects from agricultural production are large.
In the international arena, small economies will choose the same policies that maximize world welfare, but large economies have an incentive to set policies at non-internalizing levels to exploit terms of trade effects. In particular, large importers will choose policies that increase agricultural factors beyond globally efficient allocations, while large exporters prefer to restrict factor allocations (and hence agricultural production) to raise the internationa l price. For large economies, production policies that are ostensibly justified on environmental grounds can become instruments to distort international prices. Indeed, based on empirical policy simulations, we estimate the U.S. alone could manipulate it s domestic environmental policies to change the world price by about 9%.
Even for small countries with environmental concerns, there are additional policy goals such as supporting farm incomes or enhancing food security. In the WTO negotiations over environmental issues, therefore, it may impossible to determine whether so-called environmental policies are really vehicles to help achieve some other goal. The key to making domestic policies compatible with free trade lies in the types of policies used. The less the policy instruments distort trade, the more autonomy nations can have in selecting and executing domestic policy goals. 
Derivation of Optimal Factor Allocation Conditions: Large Open Economy
From equation (16) the derivatives of the large-economy national income function Ĩ are:
Substituting these derivatives and Roy's Identity (v p = -xv I ) into the conditions for a welfare maximum: Thus, as long as the net marginal benefit of each factor in agriculture is positive (i.e., the sum of marginal private and external benefits outweigh marginal costs), the price function must be decreasing in both arguments. Alternative cases (for example, when the cost of pollution on each acre is larger than the combined value of farm production and amenity benefits) are ruled out by assumption.
